catfish

i run on water and thought, but only as it consumes me and not because i am human.

an overwhelming subpopulous of humanity pursues thought as if it were food. not as if it were a delicacy, and not in the way we sought after food when food was/is scarce, but in the same greedy insatiable way that is characteristic of fast food nations... dare i say "brain obesity"... actually no... i'm not going to go there... because then i'd have to talk about omega six and placental malleability and the origins of intelligence and i don't have it in me at the moment. but. why are we so hungry for thought? and not just thought for the sake of wonder; we have conglomerated on this idea that thought is worthless if it doesn't lead to concrete ends. answers. explanations. and this... is extremism. and this... is what intraspecies competition has come to (and you... can think about that one because i'm not going to follow it up just now).

i do not fit in well in the world of medicine for two reasons: patients, and the government.

patients - unless they are of the mindset that i am about to indulge - expect medicine to perform miracles. to be god in a 400 mg tablet of compressed powder. the thing is that medicine doesn't work that way... because your body's biochemistry doesn't work that way. nobody has the same performance of metabolism, digestion or cellular transduction mechanisms. ergo, exogenous chemicals do not affect everyone in the same way (to the same end that diets don't work the same way for everyone and people give up on them because their body didn't respond optimally, which is why being conscious of your active health is the better alternative). for the most part, we're built to perform the same biological functions and a high enough concentration of a drug will do similar things in us all: alleviate the system malfunction it was designed to target. however. because we are not built like appliances, we respond differently. tylenol works for the most part with innocuous residue because its target is so well understood, and happens to be fairly well behaviorally conserved across humans. most biochemical mechanisms are not so simple. yes, there are myriad side effects for every drug. that is because almost any patient who takes that drug will have at least one of those side effects. almost nobody will have all of them, because your reaction depends on the particular idiosyncrasies of your system. to bring about a point, i do not fit in well in the world of medicine because patients do not understand or accept this, and i am totally okay with it. because i understand that if you're going to endogenously assault the body, you had better damn well cater to the specific nature of that body in the best way you can. or, if you're going to take a drug that's on the market but not quite yet understood in its entirety, you had better damn well not expect it to work perfectly in your very particular system. because i think that there is no single answer to any question, and that more often than not the answers end up making the questions more mysterious and any concrete answer more elusive (for the same reason, i could never be a politician, lawyer or historian). point: if we did not so vehemently lust after thought as a provider of perfect answers, we would not have unfathomable expectations of medicine, would not be so disappointed, would not lose confidence in science, and i would fit perfectly in the world of medicine.

the government - on whom i will not get started because the rant is unending - protects the patient, and is not only unyielding to the nature of medicine as a science, but is the propago mater that defines the patient's expectations of medicine... fucking conservative tyrannical government... screwing up what i want to do with my life...

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i really don't think this is scheherazade's fault. yes, intelligence is attractive, and helps propagate the species and all that junk (not that we're prized machines to be replicated anymore, but that's another problem). but really, intrigue is always in the invigorating mystery, and being able to speculate without needing to arrive at an end, but enough to shape our tendancies... that should be what our species runs on. r o m a n t i c p r a g m a t i s m.

and so i am a catfish. benthic, beneath the chaos created by the noise of humanity's greedy hunger for this particular kind of knowledge. detritivorous, feeding on the development of thoughts that people discard because they are unrefined and inconclusive. and running on water. i could carry this one even further and say that like the male catfish, i house and nurture eggs of thought with my mouth until they are ready to hatch... but i'm not going to...


really? with the metaphor and the disgusting cliche? yes, yes i did.

science

i’ve never understood the whole “the science has been settled on this issue” argument. it kind of gives science a bad name. it’s statements like this that make conservatives hate science and deem its arguments meaningless or frivolous.

the real deal is that science never settles on anything. anything. that is why i love it so ardently. scientific research doesn’t prove things, or provide succinct answers… rather, it makes the questions more invigorating, and answers more mysterious.

[note: the question of the earth being flat and other such self withstanding phenomena are outside of the realm i am addressing because they are not correlational with other phenomena. likewise, we may someday discover that earth really isn't round after all, but is part of a ten dimensional schema which gives us the perception of its being round.]

how do i place any weight in the arguments made by science if i believe this to be the case? well first of all, you have to make the distinction between basic science and pseudoscience (or the politically preferred, applied science). the former being research for the sake of making connections between cause and effect, and discovering interaction between phenomena with the understanding that what the discovery reveals may or may not be the answer to an important question… like the cure for cancer (which for the record, i believe is RNAi). the latter, then, is science for the purpose of moving money: find this cure, find that technology, we will fund you if you provide us with an answer, we will fund you if you side with us on this policy issue. i fucking hate money.

that being said, in believing that scientific answers lead to heightened mystery, i avoid discrediting the substance science provides by referring only to basic science, and excluding pseudoscience. pseudoscience takes the hints and suggestions of scientific findings and exaggerates and tweaks them to make a pronounced argument (lead levels in kids causes this behavior, tobacco causes cancer, etc.). basic science takes the same hints and suggestions and throws them into society as just that – possibility. this has been shown to work under a set of conditions which are all we have to rely on at this point in time to mimic the conditions of the public. let’s throw the information (or drug) out into society and see if those conditions were accurately mimicked and if our discovery has enduring merit. i astutely believe that the answers provided by basic science - if properly interpreted by the public in the way i’ve just described – can provide answers to questions while at the same time be subject to contradiction by progression of scientific inquiry. that is the nature of science. all answers are subject to being proven wrong, or to one of several possible answers.

so yes, the science is settled in pseudoscience to the end that it settles where the money tells it to, and does not respond well to criticism or contradiction. basic science, on the other hand, is never settled. and yet, i believe the latter is the genre that lends greater value to expanding our understanding of the world and our implementation of technology and healing processes.

autonoetic awareness and episodic memory

Much of the human experience – the way we characterize ourselves as persons – can be attributed to our episodic memory. This is the ability to travel through time, in the form of recollection, to past experiences in order to know how and why we acquired certain knowledge. Episodic memory is characterized by Endel Tulving by three qualities: sense of time, self, and autonoetic awareness. He describes it as a phenomenological quality distinct to humans, and not experienced by non-human animals. But here's where it gets hazy... it is difficult to assess whether non-human animals exercise episodic memory because they can't linguistically report their personal experiences. As such, our best shot at at studying episodic memory in non-human animal models is to assess the animal’s memory of what happened, where it happened and when it happened. Because such tests do not require a consciously directed inference to memory, they are said to assess episodic-like memory.

This consciously directed inference is what Tulving called autonoetic awareness... being the directed retrieval of a specific object of memory. This is distinct from autonoetic consciousness, which Tulving does not reference in describing episodic memory, but which is important to defining the phenomenon in non-human animals. Autonoetic consciousness has no object; rather, it is the fluid link throughout one’s past memories, present, and future projections.

Autonoetic awareness requires the use of mental time travel: reliving a targeted event of the past and using it to consider possible future scenarios. Autonoetic consciousness, because it does not require identifying the context of a specific event, does not imply mental time travel. One can conceivably travel back in time along a conscious continuum without targeting a specific time and place for an event, but knowing that it occurred somewhere in the past. For example, a person knows when and where they were born without remembering the experience. It becomes difficult to assess which of the two phenomena occurs in non-human animals because they can't declare thoughts about specific events of the past. We can't assume that because non-human animals can’t verbalize mental time travel that they do not have it, and therefore do not have autonoetic awareness. This confound requires the development of tests that allow non-human animals to declare their thoughts not with verbalization, but gesture or other physical expression.

Rhesus monkeys can appropriately refuse to submit to a visual image test when they do not think they will choose the correct answers. This test design successfully demonstrates that monkeys know when they remember a learning event or not. However, it does not directly implicate mental time travel, or presume autonoetic awareness. More likely, it suggests autonoetic consciousness - knowing that a particular piece of information is lodged somewhere in memory, but not necessarily targeting it on the streamline of consciousness. Because studies like this one more closely imply autonoetic consciousness, they support the theory of episodic-like memory, and not human-like episodic memory.

Clayton and Dickinson are pretty famous for their studies on Scrub jays argue, again, that non-human animals exhibit episodic-like memory based on an experimental design which targeted two of the three qualities of episodic memory: sense of time, and self. Clayton and Dickinson designed a caching apparatus in which scrub jays could store both preferred perishable (worms), and less preferred non-perishable (peanuts) foods. After a short period away from the caching apparatus, Scrub jays preferred to recover the worms. But... after a longer delay, they chose to recover the non-perishable although less preferred food. This fairly ingeniusly exemplifies the use of autonoetic consciousness in the birds... but in spite of its brilliant layout does not speak to autonoetic awareness.

It's worth noting that an argument could be made for the presence of autonoetic awareness in scrub jays based on their ability to distinguish between a 4hr and 124hr time period. This observation (part of the Clayton/Dickinson study) suggests that the jays were able to target a general place in time when they cached both foods so as to be able to discern that the preferred food (worm) had likely decayed since. Inferring this kind of targeting argues for autonoetic awareness... However!, it may also be the case that as with the Rhesus monkeys, the 124hr delay may have allowed scrub jays simply to forget when they cached an item. It has been shown to be the case in both rat and primates modeled in similar tasks that the memory of “when” was poorer than “what,” and “where." So... if this was the case with the scrub jays, then not being able to recall exactly when they cached the food stuff, they may have recovered the less-perishable but less preferable food simply to avoid the risk that the preferred food may have decayed. The propensity of risk averse behavior in scrub jays may give stronger baring to the argument for autonoetic consciousness than autonoetic awareness... eh?


So my last blip of this rant is this: there has been insight into the anatomical component of episodic memory in humans that may provide a link between behavioral demonstrations in humans and non-human animals. In humans, the right prefrontal cortex has been identified as a key brain region in the recall of episodic memories. Given that Clayton/Dickinson claim that their experimental design targets episodic-like memory retrieval, it would be a valuable experiment to investigate the prefrontal cortex activity in these birds as they are retrieving cached food. If the same region of the prefrontal cortex is activated during this activity, it suggests the biochemical validity of the Scrub jay findings. However, the Scrub jay is evolutionarily several orders of phylogeny removed from humans... this presents the confound of their significantly less developed prefrontal cortex. In the primate and rat models of episodic-like memory, it would be invaluable to compare a PET assessment of right prefrontal cortex activity during memory tasks. If, in the primate model, there were both a behavioral correlate in episodic-like memory tasks and activity in the right prefrontal cortex, we might be able to definitively say that animals experience episodic memory in the same way that humans do. That is, that they exercise sense of self, time and autonoetic awareness.

For now, we are only able to infer that non-human animals exhibit episodic-like memory. It remains to be concluded whether non-human animals exercise autonoetic consciousness or awareness. Determining which phenomenon is occuring will give greater insight into the behavior of non-human animals, and better address the question of whether episodic-like memory is as close to episodic memory as non-human animals get. It is entirely possible that non-human animals have only episodic-like memory because they have autonoetic consciousness, and not autonoetic awareness. However, it may also be the case that we have not found a way to enable non-human animals to declare their past experiences in a suitable way...

fanaticism.

The idea of getting it right every single time is not realistic. Too much pressure to make the right choice at every step makes us frustrated and filled with angst... and we are more likely not to make any of the choices we ambitiously intended at all.

This is where so many doctrines are flawed; they don't function corroboratively with pragmatism. Religion, environmentalism, science, policy... strive to be louder and more important than their ism peers, and in so doing, become campaigns of hysteria. They lose their stalwart integrity and become gritty and desperate. And as they take on this nature we, as humans, agnize the ridiculousness of abiding by every rule at every step... and most unfortunately, rather become cowed by our own fanaticism than turn to pragmatic innovation of our behavior.

If we wait for the perfect leader, nothing will ever get done. If we set out to be immediately flawless, we are doomed to fail. Deliberation is what gives integrity to a campaign, and holds it shy of fanaticism. But we are hungry for a coherent package of rules... and deliberation encourages clauses of exceptions, which teeter precariously on the stilts of innovation with which we have not yet learned to walk confidently. Why are we so pusillanimous of breaking the rules in the name of pragmatism? It doesn't seem physically plausible to be so entirely unaccepting of philosophical integration without becoming dysfunctional - without undermining our precious capacity to critically assess the balance of things.

I'm rather doomed to be a little pragmatic, and not tied to the rigidity of certain campaigns. Avoid some things generally. Pay attention. Be cognizant that I can't do everything.

empty thoughts II

2. “The ability to categorize is what makes it possible to use previous experience to guide the interpretation of new experience, for without categorization, memory is virtually useless” (Jackendoff 1987).

What kind of function would memory have if it were not categorized? Would memory be retrievable, and in what form? There must be some evolutionary reason to have uncategorized memory, because before memory could become associative, it makes sense that it would have begun with a single category with all information lumped together…

supervenience of subconsciousness

“It is clear that there is no more of a conceptual entailment from biochemistry to consciousness than there is from silicon of from a group of homunculi…. So consciousness fails to logically supervene on the physical.”

Chalmers is suggesting that consciousness can't be reduced to a physical structure or property because the silicon model of neural circuitry is functionally identical to biochemical neural circuitry, yet the silicon model can't exhibit consciousness. This is an assumption that silicon and neural circuits are identical... but I would contend that there is a “conceptual entailment from biochemistry” that provides a physical property on which consciousness may very well supervene.

The difference between a silicon and neural circuit is plainly that the former is closed and the latter is open... such that the electrical flow of messages through each respective circuit may occur in the same phenomenological fashion, but not the same physical fashion. Namely, when circulating an electrical signal, a closed circuit releases energy only in the form of heat, whereas an open circuit releases energy as mostly Gibbs free energy with the ability to do work, and very little heat. A silicon circuit is not self propagating, namely, through its path it meets only with resistors and inductors which cause it to dissipate heat. However, a neuronal signal is self propagating, and free energy in its environment is both consumed and produced by that process. This, of course, is assuming that energy and heat are physical properties on which consciousness might supervene. Since the free energy has the capacity to perform work, and heat does not, the neural circuit is the one with the ability to support consciousness.
Because free energy is undefined aside from its ability to do work, it is possible that this particular physical property is the medium through which neural structure and consciousness are connected. Therefore, I propose that the changes in free energy that occur during electrical signal propagation in a neural circuit may be the physical cause of consciousness. Free energy, being the physical difference between a neural and silicon circuit, would explain consciousness arising in one and not the other, and provide a physical property to which consciousness might be reduced.

But all this... is written out of fear. If humans manage during my lifetime to find the physical matter of consciousness such that we can replicate it... my soul will crumble, and my fascination with the human condition will suffer a dreadful, murderous demise. As a neurochemist, I need for there to be some manner of correlation between biochemistry and consciousness. As a mind, I need for that matter to be untouchable, and irreplicable.